We construct a model to capture the Keynesian idea that production and employment decisions are based on expectations of aggregate demand driven by sentiments, and that realized demand follows from the production and employment decisions of …rms. We cast the Keynesian idea into a simple model with imperfect information about aggregate demand and we characterize the rational expectations equilibria of this model. We …nd that equilibrium is not unique despite the absence of any non-convexities or strategic complementarity in the model. In addition to multiple fundamental equilibria there can be serially correlated stochastic equilibria driven by self-ful…lling consumer sentiments.Furthermore these sentiment-driven equilibria are not based on randomizations over the fundamental equilibria.
Introduction
We construct a model to capture the Keynesian insight that employment and production decisions are based on expectations of consumer demand driven by sentiments and that realized aggregate demand follows …rms'production and employment decisions. We cast the Keynesian insight in a simple model where …rms must produce in advance without having perfect information about aggregate demand, and where realized demand and income depends on …rms'output and employment decisions. We characterize the rational expectations equilibria of this model. We …nd that despite the lack of any non-convexities in technologies and preferences, there can be multiple rational expectations equilibria. 1 The sentiment-driven equilibria are the result of the signal extraction problem faced by …rms when production decisions must be made prior to the realization of demand.
The sentiment-driven ‡uctuations in our model may be driven by waves of optimism or pessimism, or as in Keynes' terminology by "animal spirits," as noted in the block quote above. However unlike Keynes' contention, the sentiments in our model give rise precisely to perpetually self-ful…lling rational expectations equilibria, even though they are the outcome of the "weighted average of quantitative bene…ts multiplied by quantitative probabilities" that turn out to be correct.
Our model is inspired by Angeletos and La'o (2011) on sentiment driven ‡uctuations as well as the Lucas (1972) island model. In our baseline model trades take place in centralized markets rather than bilaterally through random matching, and at the end of the period all trading history is public knowledge. Informational asymmetries exist only within the period as …rms decide on how much to produce on the basis of the signals they receive at the beginning of the period. We extend our approach in Benhabib, Wang and Wen (2012) into a setting with aggregate preference shocks. In the model …rms make production and employment decisions based on a noisy signal on consumer demand. Therefore …rms face a signal extraction problem. We show that under reasonable conditions the signal extraction problem can lead to a continuum of sentiment-driven self-fulling equilibria. In contrast to Benhabib, Wang and Wen (2012), sentiment-driven equilibria can arise here without any idiosyncratic noise in …rms'information sets. They can be serially correlated over time, and furthermore, they are not based on randomizations over the fundamental equilibria.
We describe the baseline model, the behavior of households, and the equilibria in the Sections that follow. In Section 5 we explore the persistence properties of the model when the preference shock is driven by an autoregressive process, but we leave the exploration of Markov sunspots that randomize the fundamental and sentiment driven equilibria to the reader. 2 Finally we extend our model to the cases where consumer sentiments are heterogenous but correlated, and show that the results continue to hold.
Baseline Model
We consider a simple Dixit-Stiglitz model where the …nal consumption good is produced by a representative …nal-good …rm from a continuum of intermediate goods. Each intermediate good is produced by a single monopolistic …rm. Producers of intermediate goods must make production and employment decisions before the demand for intermediate good is realized. 3 The output from each …rm is then combined by a representative …nal-good producer to yield the …nal consumption good. Producers can perfectly observe the entire history of the economy up to the current decision period. At this stage production has not yet taken place, so households have only expectations or sentiments about their real wage and employment to guide their consumption plans, along with aggregate shocks to their preferences-which is the only fundamental shock we consider in this paper. 4 Households can infer the real wage based on their sentiments about aggregate demand and their aggregate preference shock. The …rms engage in market research and consumer surveys to get a sense, or a noisy signal, about consumer sentiments and aggregate demand. They then try to infer the island-speci…c demand for their particular intermediate goods based on their information set or imperfect signals, so they face a signal extraction problem. They hire workers from households by o¤ering a nominal wage. As already noted, the households have an expectation of the realization of output, and therefore of prices and the real wage.
We show that in equilibrium …rms'speculations on the sentiments of the households will be self-ful…lling, in the sense that at realized prices the goods markets and the labor market will clear, household expectations of the prices and real wages will be correct, and …rms' forecasts of consumption demand will be recti…ed. Furthermore the actual equilibrium distribution of output in this set-up will be consistent with the distribution of consumer sentiments in a stochastic self-ful…lling equilibrium. We obtain, therefore, a stochastic rational expectations equilibrium driven by consumer sentiments, and such an equilibrium is not based on radomizations over multiple fundamental equilibria, in constrast to the indeterminacy literature (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; and Farmer 2012) . 5 In addition to the sentiment-driven equilibria, we can also obtain multiple fundamental rational expectations equilibria driven only by fundamental shocks but not by sentiments, despite the lack of any non-convexities in technologies and preferences or complementarities in individual actions in our model.
To generate aggregate ‡uctuations, sentiments in our model must be correlated across households. In the benchmark model, the aggregate sentiment is identical for all consumers. In the extension in Section 6 the consumer sentiments have a common as well as an iid idiosyncratic component. In this set-up we obtain essentially the same results.
To be more explicit, a representative household derives utility from a …nal good and leisure. The …nal good is produced by a representative …nal goods producer using a continuum of intermediate goods indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. Each intermediate good is produced using labor. We use labor as the numéraire so the wage rate is …xed at 1. The real wage (in terms of …nal goods) can of course ‡uctuate with the price of the …nal goods. The households are subject to aggregate preference (fundamental) shocks and sentiment (non-fundamental) shocks in each period. In the equilibrium of the benchmark model the households have perfect foresight. Namely, conditional on the aggregate shock and their sentiments, they can perfectly forecast the price level. Based on the forecasted price, they make their consumption and labor supply decisions. The consumption decisions made by the households are the source of noisy demand signals for the intermediate goods producers. Based these demand signals, obtained through market research, intermediate goods producers decide how much to produce, and the price of each intermediate good adjusts to equalize demand and supply on each island. These prices then determine the average cost of the …nal good and hence the price of the …nal good. In equilibrium this realized price coincides with the price expected by households based on sentiments. The results extend to the case where consumer sentiments are heterogenous but correlated.
Households
A representative household derives utility from …nal goods and leisure according to the utility function,
where C t is consumption of the …nal good, A t is the preference shock and N t is labor supply. We assume that = 0 for convenience. 6 The parameter is the inverse of price elasticity of …nal good consumption. We normalize the nominal wage to 1 and write the household's budget constraint as P t C t N t + t , where P t is the price of the …nal good and t is the aggregate pro…t income from all intermediate …rms. = W t as the real wage, the budget constraint becomes
5 See Cass and Shell (1983) for the classical case of sunspot equilibrium that is not based on randomizations over fundamental equilibria. 6 The quasi-linear utility function is assumed for simplicity without loss of generality.
Note that the real incomes of households ‡uctuate with P t . The …rst order condition for
A conjectured decrease in the price level P t will induce the household to consume more. Households observe the aggregate preference shock A t and an aggregate sentiment ("sunspot") shock Z t and conjecture that the equilibrium aggregate price is given by P t = P (A t ; Z t ). We assume z t log(Z t ) is normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance. An equilibrium is a "fundamental equilibrium" if it is not a¤ected by z t . Otherwise we call the equilibrium a "sentiment-driven equilibrium".
Firms
The supply side has a representative …nal good producer and a continuum of intermediate goods producers indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. The …nal good producer serves as an aggregator of all intermediate goods, and it does not play an active role in the model. We assume the …nal good producer makes decisions after all shocks are realized, so its decisions are not subject to any uncertainty.
The …nal good …rm. The …nal good …rm solves
where C t is produced by a continuum of intermediate goods according to the Dixit-Stiglitz production function,
The …nal goods producer's pro…t maximization problem yields the inverse demand function for each intermediate good,
and the aggregate price index,
The Intermediate goods …rms. The intermediate goods …rms use labor as the only input to produce output according to
Unlike the households and the …nal good producer, the intermediate goods producers face uncertainty in making their production decisions: they do not have full information regarding the aggregate demand shock A t and the aggregate price P t . We assume that intermediate …rm j has to choose its production based on a noisy signal about aggregate demand. Denote the signal as S jt . The intermediate good …rm j solves
with the constraint (6). Substituting out P jt , the …rst order condition for C jt is
Using the …rst order condition of the household in equation (3), we then have
We assume that the signal is a mixture of aggregate demand (C t ) and idiosyncratic noise (v jt ) given by
where v jt is normally distributed with mean of 0 and variance of 2 v . For notational convenience we will re-scale the aggregate preference shock A t as A t = 1 exp(a t = ), where a t is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2 a . We note that in what follows, the noise v jt will not be essential for our results: we could have set 2 v = 0: In that case the signal s jt would fully reveal aggregate consumption c t to the intermediate goods …rms, but as we will see in section 4, sentiment-driven rational expectations equilibria would still exist.
General Equilibrium
We de…ne the general equilibrium recursively as follows:
Based on the preference shock A t and sentiment Z t , households conjecture that the aggregate price is given by P t = P (A t ; Z t );
Based on the conjectured price P t , the households choose their consumption plan C t = C(A t ; Z t ) according to (3) to maximize their utility;
The consumption decisions create signals to …rms j as log S jt = c t + v jt ; Based on the signal S jt , …rm j produces C jt according to (11) to maximize its expected pro…t;
Given the production of C jt , price P jt adjusts to equate demand and supply according to equation (6);
The total production of …nal good C t ; according to (5) , equals the households' planed consumption. Hence the realized aggregate price is also equal to the conjectured price P t .
It turns out that equations (5), (11) and (12) are su¢ cient to characterize the general equilibrium. We conjecture that the equilibrium production (in logarithm) can be written as log C jt =c + c jt and log C t = c + c t , and that c jt and c t are solutions to the following systems of equations:
where
Notice that > 1 and > 0, hence we have 2 ( 1; 1). The intermediate …rm's output c it would decrease with aggregate demand c t if < 0, which implies that intermediate goods are strategic substitutes; whereas > 0 would correspond to the case of strategic complementarity among intermediate goods. Hence, our model is ‡exible enough to characterize both strategic complementarity and strategic substitutability in production, and our results hold true even if < 0. Equilibrium in the model is then fully characterized by fc; cg and two mappings, c jt = c jt (s jt ) and c t = c(a t ; z t ) that solve equations (13) for all j and equation (14) . We are now ready to characterize all the possible equilibria.
Fundamental Equilibria
We …rst study the equilibria driven only by fundamentals, in particular by preference shocks a t . In a fundamental equilibrium neither aggregate consumption c t nor the production of each intermediate goods c jt is a¤ected by consumer sentiments. We show that this simple model permits multiple fundamental equilibria. We use a conjecture-and-veri…cation strategy to …nd the equilibria. A guess for the solution to the system of equations (13) to (15) is
where is an undetermined coe¢ cient. Fnding equilibrium is then equivalent to determining the coe¢ cient :
A Constant Output Equilibrium
Proposition 1 c jt = c t = 0 is always an equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix A.1 In this case consumption does not respond to preference shock a t ; namely, the demand elasticity = 0 and the equilibrium aggregate price P t = exp ( p + a t = ). To see the intuition, suppose that there is an increase in a t , which makes households want to spend more if all else is equal. But whether households actually spend more also depends on their expectation of the aggregate price (or real wage). In the above equilibrium, households conjecture that the price will rise exactly in the proportion to preference shocks so their incentive to consume more is completely curbed.
Stochastic Fundamental Equilibria
In this case consumption responds to the preference shock a t with the demand elasticity 2 0; 1 . We show that there can be two such equilibria in the model under certain conditions. Suppose household consumption in logarithm is given by log C t c = c t = a t , with > 0. Households conjecture that price is given by log P t p = p a t = ( 1 )a t . Note that equation (3) is satis…ed, implying that the households'consumption is optimal. In what follows we use the method of undetermined coe¢ cients to determine the coe¢ cient and the constants c and p.
To solve for , we utilize equation (13) . Using the above conjectured equilibrium for c t , we express the production of each intermediate good …rm as
Aggregating all …rms'output across j gives aggregate output c t ; then by matching the coe¢ cient of a t we obtain
Rearranging terms leads to a quadratic equation in :
Notice that in general, there is no guarantee that the solution to the above equation is unique. Denoting
as the noise ratio, we have the following Proposition:
, let c t = log C t c = a t and c jt = log P t p = 1 a t . In a rational expectations equilibrium each …rm j produces
where is given by
and f c; p;cg are given by
Proof: See Appendix A.2
This proposition shows that for any given value of the noise ratio 2 0;
, there exist two additional fundamental equilibria, each corresponds to a particular value of . In the special case where v jt 0, so that 2 v = 0, namely, when the signal fully reveals aggregate demand c t to the …rms, it is easy to see from equation (19) that one of the equilibria now coincides with the constant output equilibrium with = 0. In the second equilibrium we have = (1 ) 1 . Since the signal reveals c t fully, from equation (21) a t is also fully revealed to …rms in equilibrium, so we may call this type of equilibrium (with 2 v = 0) the full information equilibrium. In the two additional fundamental equilibria of Proposition 2, the equilibrium price does not respond fully to preference shocks. If the households think price will respond to the preference shocks less strongly, they will consume more in the aggregate when a t increases. This then sends a more precise signal to the intermediate goods producers as consumption volatility would be relatively larger relative to the noisy in the signal. As a result, the …rms produce more and indeed, the aggregate market clearing price rises less, con…rming the initial belief of the households. 7 
Sentiment-Driven Equilibria
Now we consider another type of equilibrium at which consumption responds to a pure sentiment variable z t that is completely unrelated to the fundamental shock a t . More importantly, the variance (uncertainty) of sentiments is itself a self-ful…lling object. We note that the existence of sentiment-driven equilibria is not based on randomizations over the fundamental equilibria studied above.
Suppose households incur a sentiment shock called z t . After knowing the sentiment shock and observing aggregate preference shock a t , households choose their optimal consumption based on their conjecture of the price level. Let us conjecture an equilibrium in which household consumption takes the form
along with the conjectured price p t = a a t + z z t . For notational convenience, we have normalize the variance of z t to unity, so the scaler z represents the standard deviation of the sentiment shock (i.e., var( z z t ) = 2 z ). Given aggregate consumption demand, the production of the individual …rm j is
Aggregating …rm-level production across j and comparing coe¢ cients of a t and z t between this aggregated equation and equation (26) gives
and
Notice that equations (29) and (30) are identical as long as 6 = 0.
Lemma 1 If = 0, then there is no sentiment-driven equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is straightforward. If = 0, and suppose a sentiment-driven equilibrium exists. Then (30) becomes
Since < 1, we have a contradiction. At each sentiment-driven equilibrium within this interval, the conjectured price by the consumer is given by
and the optimal consumption level is given by
. The constants in the price and consumption rules are given by
Proof: See Appendix 3.
Re-arranging equation (30) yields
Hence, the equilibrium aggregate demand (production) is determined by
which shows that not only the level of sentiments z t matters but the variance of sentiments also matters (since depends on z by equation (34)). More importantly, the degree of uncertainty, that is 2 z ; is itself self-ful…lling in a sentiment-driven equilibrium. The intuition for the sentiment-driven equilibria is similar to the intuition for multiple fundamental equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on consumer's expectation of the aggregate price level, which depends negatively on the sentiments (equation (32)). If consumers are optimistic, they would anticipate a lower aggregate price level (cheaper consumption goods), so they opt to consume more. Since …rms cannot distinguish the fundamental shock a t from the sentiment shock z t , they opt to produce more to meet the higher expected consumption demand indicated by the signal, which ful…ll the consumer sentiments. On the other hand, if demand is more volatile due to more variable sentiments, …rms would opt to attach less weight to fundamentals (preferences) in signal extraction, rendering production more volatile. Namely, at each sentiment-driven equilibrium (indexed by z ), the intermediate goods …rms produce exactly the amount of goods, aggregated into the …nal good, that the households want to consume, and markets clear. (28), the …rms set their optimal outputs under imperfect information using their signal s jt = c t because they do not directly observe a t and z t separately. So in this case even if aggregate consumption c t is fully observed by intermediate goods …rms, we see from (33) that sentiments z t still drive aggregate and …rm outputs in rational expectations equilibria.
In Figure 1 we plot the coe¢ cients for the fundamental stochastic equilibria in Proposition 2, and the corresponding coe¢ cients for the sentiment-driven equilibria in Proposition 3, against variance of the noise 2 v . We calibrate = 10 8 , = 1, the variance of log A t at 4:5, and plot against feasible z , a pair of stochastic fundamental equilibria where aggregate consumption c t is driven only by fundamental shocks a t , and a constant output equilibrium.
Persistence
In this section we show that the sentiment-driven equilibria can be serially correlated over time under reasonable information structures, and that the persistence in the sentimentdriven equilibria mimics the serial correlation property of the fundamental shocks. Note that so far the noise v jt is not essential for producing sentiment-driven equilibria, hence we drop it from the signal. Suppose that the aggregate shock follows
where = 0 is the special case we considered before. We assume that each …rm can observe the entire history of aggregate production (or aggregate demand c t k , k = 0; 1; 2; :::) but not the history of preference shocks separately. Namely
In this case, as in the benchmark model, the stochastic fundamental equilibria still exist. It is easy to show that at a fundamental equilibrium, we have c jt = c t = 1 1 a t , where = 1 . We conjecture the existence of sentiment-driven equilibria where z t is serially correlated and aggregate output takes the form
where the sentiment z t follows the same law of motion as the aggregate preference shocks,
Again we have normalized the variance of " zt to unity. At a sentiment-driven equilibrium the past realizations of aggregate consumption cannot help …rms pin down the innovations in fundamental shock " t k ; k = 1; 2; ::. The past history however can reveal the sum of " t k and " z;t k for k 1. So the signal for …rm j is s jt = [ " t + z " z;t ; :::; " t k + z " z;t k ; :::]:
The e¤ective signal for a …rm's decision making can be simpli…ed to s jt = [ " t + z " z;t ; a t 1 + z z t 1 ]. Proposition 4 shows the conditions for the existence of serially correlated sentiment-driven equilibria.
Proposition 4 There exists a continuum of sentiment-driven equilibria indexed by the noise ratio 
The …rst order condition for consumers now changes to
Aggregating across consumers, we obtain the aggregate consumption c t = log C t = log(
. As before, we assume that each …rm receives a noisy signal log S jt = c t +v jt . The production decision by the …rms is given by equation (10) as before, namely,
An equilibrium of the economy is de…ned again as in Section 2.3. Conjecturing that equilibrium consumption and production (in logs) can be written as log C jt =c + c jt , log C t = c + c t , and log C it =ĉ + c it , we have the following Proposition: . At each equilibrium, consumers conjecture that the aggregate price will be
and their idiosyncratic consumption demand is
where = 1 2(1 )
. Aggregate consumption (output) is given by
each individual …rm's optimal production is
and the constant terms are given by
(58)
Proof: See Appendix 5.
Conclusion
We explore the Keynesian idea that sentiments or animal spirits can in ‡uence the level of aggregate income and give rise to recurrent boom-bust cycles. We show that in a production economy, pure sentiments (completely unrelated to fundamentals) can indeed a¤ect economic performance and the business cycle even though (i) expectations are fully rational, (ii) there are no externalities or non-convexties or even strategic complementarities.
In particular, we show that when consumption and production decisions must be made separately by consumers and …rms based on mutual forecasts of each other's actions 10 , the equilibrium outcome can indeed be in ‡uenced by animal spirits or sentiments, even though all agents are fully rational. Furthermore the existence of sentiment-driven equilibria is not based on randomizations over the fundamental equilibria studied above. The key to generating our results is a natural friction in information: Although …rms can perfectly observe or forecast consumption demand, they cannot separately identify the components of demand stemming from consumer sentiments as opposed to preference shocks (fundamentals). Sentiments matter because they are correlated across households, so they a¤ect aggregate demand and real wages di¤erently than shocks to aggregate productivity (or preferences). Faced with a signal extraction problem …rms make optimal production decisions that depend on the degree of sentiment uncertainty, or the variance of sentiment shocks. In our model there exists a continuum of (normal) distributions for sentiment shocks indexed by their variances that give rise to self-ful…lling rational expectations equilibria.
A Appendix

A. 1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Suppose households conjecture that the aggregate price is given by
where P t satis…es equation (3) . Then aggregate consumption must be a constant C. This implies that the signal s jt = log C t + v jt is nothing but pure noise. Hence, by equation (10) each …rm's production is also a constant given by C jt = C t = C. Equation (11) can be written as
which, under the log-normal assumptions, implies
This implies
Since the conjecture of the aggregate price is self-ful…lling, the total supply is indeed a constant and all markets clear under the conjectured prices.
A. 2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: From the de…nition of we obtain
Note that there are two solutions for if 0 < < max (1 (1 ) ) = 1 4 (1 ) ; given by = 1 2(1 )
It is easy to see that for > 0
Given , we can calculate the three constantsc; c and p to fully characterize the equilibrium. The fact that aggregate consumption is log-normally distributed implies that we can obtainc from equation (11) Once we obtain c, by equation (3) we can obtain p = log Since both households and the …rms'optimization conditions are satis…ed and the planned consumption equals the actual consumption, we have a rational expectations equilibrium.
A. 3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Notice that for > 0 equations (29) and (30) are identical, so we only need to consider equation (30). After re-arranging terms we obtain . Once we obtain , we can then solve forc and c. Since all …rst order conditions are satis…ed and markets clear, we have an equilibrium.
Since aggregate production is c t = a t + z z t , comparing coe¢ cients yields:
we then have 
